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Abstract 
 
Over the period 1998-2001, British Telecom (BT) dramatically increased its debt levels, from 
£4.8bn in 1998 to £31bn in 2001. This was accompanied by a dramatic decrease in the firm’s 
share price. 
 
Subsequent pressure from analysts and investors induced BT to use a rights issue to substantially 
reduce debt in 2002 (from £31bn to £18.4bn). However, the share price has continued to fall, but 
not so dramatically. 
 
Hence, BT provides an ideal case study of the effects of capital structure on firm value. In this 
case study, we will consider such questions as: 
  
a) Why did BT take on so much debt? Why did it cause firm value to fall, when many capital    
structure theories suggest a positive relationship between leverage and firm value? 
b) Why has the reduction in debt not caused an increase in equity value? 
c) Was BT beyond its optimal debt/equity ratio from 1998-2001? Is it still beyond the optimum? 
d) Does BT have an optimal capital structure? What is it? Is it static? What are the trade-offs in-
volved? 
e) Does BT’s case hold lessons for other firms? 
 
 
Introduction 
 
his paper provides an investigation into BT‟s (British Telecom‟s) capital structure policy during the period 
1998-2002. By the end of the case study, the reader should be able to relate the experiences of BT to the 
theoretical literature on the capital structure of the firm, and provide answers to the questions that appear at 
the end of this section, and again at the end of the case. 
 
  The seminal work of Modigliani and Miller (1958) analysed the conditions under which the value of the 
firm is independent of its capital structure. Their Irrelevance Theorem was based on some strong assumptions (some 
explicit, and some implicit). Subsequent research has sought to examine the conditions under which a firm‟s capital 
structure affects its value. This has mainly involved changing the assumptions behind the MM irrelevance theorem.  
 
If capital structure can affect firm value, the natural question arises; can firms identify an optimal capital 
structure, that is, a structure that maximises firm value? One way of addressing this issue is to consider a trade-off 
model that recognises that there are costs and benefits of issuing debt or equity. The optimal capital structure  trades- 
 
___________________ 
Readers with comments or questions are encouraged to contact the author via email. 
T 
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off these costs and benefits to maximise firm value. However, Myers (1998) points out that no golden rule exists for 
determining a firm‟s optimal capital structure. He argues that the optimal mix of debt and equity varies from firm to 
firm, or industry to industry, and therefore should be considered on a case by case basis. 
 
Over the period 1998-2001, British Telecom (BT) dramatically increased its debt levels, from £4.8bn in 
1998 to £31bn in 2001. This was accompanied by a dramatic decrease in the firm‟s share price. Subsequent pressure 
from analysts and investors induced BT to use a rights issue to substantially reduce debt in 2002 (from £31bn to 
£18.4bn). However, the share price has continued to fall, but not so dramatically. 
 
Hence, BT provides an ideal case study of the effects of capital structure on firm value. In this case study, 
we will consider such questions as; 
 
a)  Why did BT take on so much debt? Why did it cause firm value to fall, when many capital structure theo-
ries suggest a positive relationship between leverage and firm value? 
b)  Why has the reduction in debt not caused an increase in equity value? 
c)  Was BT beyond its optimal debt/equity ratio from 1998-2001? Is it still beyond the optimum? 
d) Does BT have an optimal capital structure? What is it? Is it static? What are the trade-offs involved? 
e)  Does BT‟s case hold lessons for other firms? 
 
Note that, throughout the case, there will be supplementary questions (in italics) which will help in answering 
the main questions. 
 
Before we consider the case of BT, we need to consider the capital structure theories in more detail. 
 
Capital Structure Theories 
 
The Miller and Modigliani Irrelevance Theorem (1958) 
 
Miller and Modigliani‟s (MM 1958) seminal work provided the impetus for all of the subsequent research on 
capital structure. Prior to their studies, corporate finance research had been piecemeal in its approach. MM demon-
strated that corporate finance problems can be considered using a modelling approach. 
 
The main result of MM‟s irrelevance theorem was that, under certain conditions, the value of the firm is inde-
pendent of its capital structure. They argued that a firm‟s investment policy has an important effect on firm value, 
whereas the financing decision is secondary (separability of financing and investment).  The theorem was based 
on the following (explicit and implicit) assumptions; the firm‟s manager is selfless, always acting in investors‟ inter-
ests (no agency costs); information about the firm is symmetrically distributed between managers and investors; debt 
is risk-free. MM also ignored the effects of corporate taxes.  
 
According to the discounted cashflow (DCF) model, the value of the firm is the discounted value of all future 
cashflows. For simplicity, MM assumed perpetuities. Hence, the value of the firm is rXV / , where X  repre-
sents the perpetual cashflows, and r  is the discount rate (or cost of capital). 
 
MM‟s first contribution was to consider the effects of leverage (the level of debt) on the cost of capital (the 
investors‟ required return for investing funds into the business). Both groups of investors (that is, debtholders and 
equityholders) require a return on their investment. MM assumed that debt is risk-free, and, therefore, debtholders 
only require the risk-free rate (the cost of debt equals the risk-free rate). 
 
Debtholders are the first claimants on a firm’s cashflows. If debt is risk-free, then equity holders face all of 
the volatility of the cashflows. Therefore, the cost of equity is higher than the risk-free rate (why?).   
 
At zero leverage, equityholders only face the business risk of the firm. Their required rate of return is termed 
the cost of unlevered equity. As leverage increases, equityholders face increasing financial risk, as the cashflows to 
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equityholders become more volatile. Hence, the cost of levered equity exceeds the cost of unlevered equity, and in-
creases with leverage. 
 
MM next demonstrated that the firm should not be concerned with the cost of debt or the cost of equity in iso-
lation, but instead should be concerned with the overall cost of capital, as measured by the weighted average cost of 
capital (WACC).  Their remarkable result was that, although the cost of debt is lower than the cost of equity, and 
cost of equity increases with leverage, the WACC is unaffected by leverage.  
 
Next, MM pointed out that the firm should use the WACC, not the cost of debt or cost of equity, as the dis-
count rate in firm valuation. That is, ,WACCr   so that ./WACCXV   Since WACC  is independent of the 
capital structure, then firm value is independent of the capital structure (provided capital structure does not af-
fect ).X  
 
Miller and Modigliani-the Effect of Taxes (1961) 
 
The 1958 irrelevance theorem may have provided a starting point for capital structure theories, but practitio-
ners found it unsatisfactory. It provided no recommendations to firms regarding their optimal capital structure; any 
capital structure was equally as good. In 1961, MM introduced the effect of taxes into their analysis. The firm pays 
taxes on net income after deductions for debt interest. Since debt provides a tax shield, firm value increases with 
debt (ceteris paribus).  However, this provided another unsatisfactory result: firm value is maximised by taking on as 
much debt as possible! 
 
Debt Capacity and Tax Relief 
 
MM had assumed risk-free debt. However, it is reasonable to assume that beyond a certain level of debt (the 
debt capacity), debt will no longer be risk-free. If debt is too high, debtholders will also face volatility of returns.  
 
Beyond the debt capacity, the cost of risky debt exceeds the cost of risk-free debt, and increases with leverage 
(why?). 
 
Since the cost of risky debt increases with leverage beyond the debt capacity, the WACC also increases with 
leverage. What will happen to firm value if expected cashflows are unaffected? 
 
In practical terms, increasing leverage beyond the debt capacity results in a downgrade of the firm‟s credit 
rating, which pushes up the cost of debt. A possible trade-off exists between the tax benefits of debt and the costs of 
debt beyond the debt capacity. This suggests that there may be an optimal capital structure that minimises WACC 
and maximises firm value. 
 
Before proceeding to the next section, attempt the following. 
 
1. Present a graph showing firm value as a function of leverage, and (on a separate graph) cost of debt, cost 
of equity and WACC as a function of leverage, in each of the following cases; 
 
a) MM irrelevance theorem. 
b) MM with taxes. 
c) Debt capacity and tax relief. 
 
What is the optimal capital structure in each case? 
 
2. Firms often argue that they use a large amount of debt since it is a cheap form of financing. What do they 
mean? Why is this argument fallacious? 
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Agency Costs and Signalling 
 
The Miller-Modigliani (1958) irrelevance theorem implicitly assumes a) that managers are selfless, purely 
acting in shareholders‟ interests, and b) that information is distributed symmetrically between managers and inves-
tors regarding the firm and its prospects. In reality, a) a principal-agent relationship may exist, whereby managers 
have incentives to act in their own self-interests, at the expense of investors, and b) managers may have more infor-
mation about the firm and its prospects than investors. 
 
In the first case, the capital structure may affect firm value by affecting managerial incentives. In the second 
case, the capital structure may affect firm value by providing signals about the firm to the investors. 
 
Agency Models 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) were the pioneers of agency cost modelling in relation to the capital structure. 
They considered a manager who gains utility from both the wealth he derives from the firm, and the private benefits 
he gains. JM assumed a direct trade-off between firm value and managerial private benefits. Every pound that the 
manager takes to private benefits represents a pound reduction in firm value. 
 
The capital structure affects the manager‟s incentives and hence firm value as follows. Leverage reducing 
capital structure changes (more outside equity, less debt) imply that the manager has a lower equity stake. This in-
duces him to take more perquisites, which reduces firm value. On the other hand, leverage increasing capital struc-
ture changes (less outside equity, more debt)  imply that the manager has a higher equity stake. This induces him to 
take less perquisites, which increases firm value.  
 
Hence, for JM, the benefit of debt is that it increases the manager‟s fractional ownership of the firm, inducing 
him to take less perquisites, which increases firm value. However, JM consider the manager‟s incentives to take 
riskier value-reducing projects (risk-shifting) as debt increases. By trading off these benefits (increased managerial 
equity ownership) and costs of debt (risk-shifting), JM obtain an optimal (value maximising) capital structure. 
 
Jensen (1986) considers the problems of free cashflow. Free cashflow is the remaining cashflow after the firm 
has invested in all of the available positive NPV projects. Since only negative NPV projects remain, the free cash-
flow should be returned to investors in the form of dividends or debt payments. However, empire-building managers 
may have an incentive to invest it in the negative NPV projects. For Jensen (1986), debt is beneficial by committing 
the firm to debt interest payments, thus reducing the free cashflow at managements disposal. Jensen uses the free 
cashflow argument to relate the level of debt to the life-cycle of the firm. He predicts that young firms, with many 
positive growth opportunities available should have (high or low?) levels of debt, while mature, stagnant firms, with 
very few growth opportunities, should have (high or low?) levels of debt. 
 
Stulz (1990) develops a free cashflow model. He derives an optimal level of debt which provides just suffi-
cient cashflow to take all of the positive NPV projects, while eliminating the possibility of taking the negative NPV 
projects.   
 
Dewatripont and Tirole (DT 1991) consider the disciplining role of debt. They develop a model of managerial 
moral hazard, where firm profit is affected by an unobservable managerial effort level. The manager dislikes high 
levels of effort.  
 
DT analyse the income rights and control rights associated with debt and equity.  Since debtholders have 
control if the firm does badly (that is, liquidation rights), high levels of debt induce a higher managerial effort level, 
and higher firm value. However, too much debt might lead to excessive interference in the firm. 
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Signalling 
 
Under conditions of asymmetric information between managers and investors, capital structure may provide 
signals, which affect firm value. We will consider 3 models (Myers and Majluf 1984, Ross 1977, and Leland and 
Pyle 1977). 
 
Myers and Majluf (1984) consider the signalling role of equity issuance.  They develop a model in which a 
firm has a new, positive NPV, investment opportunity. The manager knows the future prospects of his firm, whereas 
investors do not. Specifically, investors (in the absence of signalling by the manager) form an average expectation of 
the possibility of a good or bad state for the firm. The manager knows for sure whether the good or bad state is com-
ing.  
 
A „lemons‟ problem exists. If the manager knows that the good state is going to happen, then equity is cur-
rently undervalued, and he is unwilling to issue it, preferring to pass up the positive NPV project. If he knows that 
the bad state is going to happen, then equity is currently overvalued, so that he has an incentive to issue it. However, 
issuing equity to rational investors signals that the bad state is going to happen, and the equity value falls. 
 
Due to this lemons problem, Myers and Majluf (1984) prescribe a pecking order for firms‟ financing deci-
sions. They suggest that firms should raise investment funds in the following order. Firms should use any retained 
earnings first.  Secondly, they should use debt. Finally, they should issue equity as a last resort. 
 
Ross (1977) considers the signalling role of debt issuance.  In his model, managerial quality is private in-
formation. If the manager issues debt, and is unable to repay, he faces a utility loss through bankruptcy. A low abil-
ity manager will not be able to repay a high level of debt, and will therefore face bankruptcy. A high ability manager 
will be able to repay a high level of debt. Therefore, the high ability manager has an incentive to issue a high level of 
debt to separate from a low ability manager. In effect, the high ability manager is using a high debt level to dem-
onstrate his confidence in firm prospects to the market. 
 
Leland and Pyle‟s (LP 1977) model is analogous to that of Myers and Majluf (1984). In LP, they consider 
how a manager signals his information regarding the firm‟s prospects by the amount of equity he retains. If he issues 
a large amount of equity, thus reducing his own equity stake, the market infers that the firm is facing bad future 
prospects, and firm value falls. If he issues a small amount of equity, and retains a large amount, the market infers 
that the firm is facing good prospects, and firm value increases. Hence, as in the Myers-Majluf (1984) model, the 
Leland and Pyle (1977) model suggests that the firm would avoid issuing large amounts of equity if possible. 
 
Before moving on to the next section, consider the following question; 
 
According to these agency cost and signalling models, why might a firm wish to issue high levels of debt? 
Why might a firm wish to issue low levels of debt? 
 
Models that Search for the Optimal Capital Structure 
 
We have seen that many factors are involved when considering the effects of capital structure on firm value. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that no „golden rule‟ exists to determine a firm‟s optimal capital structure1. The opti-
mal capital structure needs to be considered on a specific firm, or specific industry, basis. Furthermore, the optimal 
capital structure is not static, but is dynamic. It may vary over time, and may depend on the stage of the firm‟s life 
cycle (eg; Jensen‟s free cashflow argument 1986), and may depend on macroeconomic and competitive conditions. 
 
Damadoran (2001) considers how firms attempt to choose optimal capital structures. He argues that firms 
should determine the optimal structure by trading off the costs and benefits of debt (give some examples of these?). 
However, in reality, firms may use one of the following methods; a) choosing debt and equity according to their life 
                                                 
1 In contrast, firms do have a golden, value maximising, investment appraisal rule, ie the net present value (NPV) rule. 
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cycle. b) Benchmarking against other firms in their industry (what are the problems with this?). c)  Strong prefer-
ence for a type of financing (pecking order theory). 
 
Levy (1998), and Opler et al (1997), have attempted to develop a formula for determining the optimal capital 
structure. Both methods form a type of sensitivity analysis, whereby the value effects of different factors of debt and 
equity financing are considered. For example, the formula derived by Opler et al (1997) includes the interest tax 
shield on debt, costs of financial distress and bankruptcy, and business risk. They do not consider agency costs. 
Levy (1998) takes the same factors as Opler et al (1997), and adds agency costs. Therefore, his list of factors is; in-
terest tax shield on debt, costs of financial distress and bankruptcy, business risk, and agency costs (what important 
aspect has Levy ignored?). 
 
Having used his formula to derive an optimal structure, Levy (1998) then suggests trying this out in the mar-
ket to see what happens (why is this dangerous?)!   
 
Optimal Capital Structure: The Case of BT
2
 
 
Over the period 1998-2001, British Telecom (BT) dramatically increased its debt levels, from £4.3bn in 1998 
to £31bn in 2001. This was accompanied by a downgrade in BT‟s credit rating, and a dramatic decrease in the firm‟s 
share price. Subsequently, BT has responded to pressure from analysts and investors to reduce the debt level, from 
£31bn to £18.4bn by March 2002.  However, the share price has continued to fall, though not so dramatically. 
Hence, BT provides an ideal case study of the effects of capital structure on firm value, and the incentives behind 
management‟s capital structure policy.  
 
The Background 
 
Until the 1980‟s, telecommunication services in the UK were provided by the GPO (General Post Office) 
which enjoyed monopoly powers. The GPO had been a Government department until 1969, when the Post Office 
Act established the GPO as a public corporation.  Under the British Telecommunications Act 1981, British Telecom 
(BT) itself became a separate public corporation. During the early eighties, the UK telecommunication industry was 
opened up to increasing competition. 
 
In 1984, BT was the first utility to become a public limited company, issuing 50.2% of its shares to the public 
and employees. BT was listed on the London, New York and Tokyo exchanges. In 1991, the Government sold over 
half of its remaining shares, retaining 22%. In 1997, the new labour government sold its remaining shares. 
 
In 2000, BT succeeded in bidding for 3G mobile licences in the UK and Germany. To finance this, BT dra-
matically increased its debt level, to £31bn. This resulted in a downgrade in its credit rating by Standard and 
Poors, from AA+ to A (a drop of 4 levels). Between the start of 2000 and May 2001, BT‟s share price had fallen by 
65%. 
 
BT began dramatic restructuring in 2001. It initiated a rights issue in June 2001. This raised £5.9bn, which 
was used to ease the massive debt levels. In November 2001, BT demerged from its mobile telecommunications 
arm, BT Wireless. This resulted in two different companies, BT Group plc and mm02.   
 
In 2002, BT‟s debt level greatly reduced. The share price and firm value continued to fall, though not so dra-
matically. 
 
 
 
 
BT- Financial Review 
                                                 
2 The data for this section is obtained from Datastream, and from an unpublished MSc dissertation by V. Mahalingham (2002).  Mahalingham 
was supervised in the writing of the dissertation by the author of this paper. 
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Table 1 summarises BT‟s 5 year financial position from year-end 31/3/1998 to 31/3/2002. 
 
 
Table 1: Financial Review of BT: 1998-2002. 
 
£m 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Group Turnover 15,640 16,953 18,715 20,427 20,559 
Profit After Tax 1731 3002 2045 (1863) 1018 
Total Debt 4770 4333 11004 30911 18440 
Equity (market Value) 41665 65402 76454 33571 24283 
Firm Market Value 46435 69735 87458 64482 42723 
Interest 260 270 319 1092 1383 
Dividends Per Share 13.32p 14.3p 15.36p 6.17p 2p 
Taxation 1488 1293 897 652 443 
Implied Interest Rate 5.45% 6.23% 2.9% 3.53% 7.5% 
 
 
First, note that group turnover has consistently increased over the 5 years, albeit with a slower growth rate be-
tween 2001 and 2002. Profit after tax increased between 1998 and 1999,  but then fell between 1999 and 2000, and 
again between 2000 and 2001. Indeed, BT Group suffered a loss 2001. Profit partially recovered in 2002. 
 
Two important factors in this table are the levels of taxation and the levels of debt interest. The implied inter-
est rate has been calculated using the levels of debt interest (how has this been calculated?).  
  
How can BT’s debt policy possibly explain the profile of tax and debt interest in the period 1998-2002?   
 
The focus of our analysis is BT’s capital structure, and the effect on equity and firm value. We observe 
that the debt level increased dramatically from £4.8bn in 1998 to £30.9bn in 2001, to finance 3G mobile licences in 
the UK and Germany. At the same time, the taxation rate dropped dramatically (why?). 
 
BT’s credit rating was downgraded dramatically over this period. What happened to interest over this pe-
riod?  
 
The market value of equity saw a steady increase from 1998 to 2000. However, the value of equity saw a 
dramatic decline from 2000 onwards (note that this coincides with the period of increasing debt). Furthermore, total 
market value fell over this period. Why? 
 
Table 2 focuses on the capital structure. The calculations are based on the figures from table 1.  Table 3 trans-
lates the market value of equity into the price per share.  
 
 
Table 2: BT’s Capital Structure: 1998-2002. 
 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
% Debt 10.3 6.2 12.6 47.9 43.2 
% Equity 89.7 93.8 87.4 52.1 56.8 
D/E Ratio 0.11 0.07 0.14 0.92 0.76 
Loan Rate % 5.45 6.23 2.90 3.53 7.50 
 
Table 2 allows us to consider BT‟s capital structure (that is, the percentages of debt and equity, the percentage 
of debt to total market value, and the debt/equity ratio), rather than the level of debt. The table emphasises that, be-
tween 1998 and 2000, the percentage of debt in the capital structure was very low, fluctuating around 10%. This 
percentage increased dramatically in 2001 and 2002, and debt almost rose to parity with equity (ie we almost saw 
50/50 debt and equity, or, equivalently, a debt/equity ratio of 1). The implied loan rate also increased dramatically. 
Table 3: Price per Share: 1998-2002. 
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 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Number of Shares (m) 9119 9185 9256 9299 8316 8681 
Price Per Share (pence) 457 712 826 361 292 207 
MV of Equity (£m) 41665 65402 76454 33571 24283 17970 
 
 
In addition to considering the market value of equity, one must also consider the number of shares and the 
price per share. Table 3 demonstrates that, since the number of shares was relatively unchanged over the 5 year pe-
riod, the profile of the market value of equity is mirrored by the profile of BT‟s share price. Hence, BT‟s market 
value of equity and share price were maximised in the year 2000. 
 
Figure 1 demonstrates the total value of BT group, the value of equity, and the value of debt (the top, middle 
and bottom lines respectively). It is easily observed that total value increased from 1998-2000 (when the level of 
debt was low).  Beyond 2000, the level of debt increased dramatically, and total firm value, and equity value fell.  
Figure 1 suggests an optimal debt level for BT.  
 
 
Figure 1. 
 
BT- Value of debt, value of equity and total 
market value.
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What was BT’s optimal debt level in 1998-2002, as suggested by figure 1?  What trade-offs might be in-
volved? 
 
Figure 2 demonstrates the percentage of debt (bottom line) and the percentage of equity (top line) in BT‟s 
capital structure over the 5 year period, and emphasises the dramatic increase in debt and the dramatic decrease in 
equity. 
 
Figure 3 demonstrates the effect of the debt/equity ratio on the implied (debt interest) loan rate. Although the 
loan rate fluctuates over the period 1998-2000 (when the debt/equity ratio is low), it increases dramatically between 
2000 and 2002 (when the debt/equity ratio increases towards 1).  
 
How does this contrast with the MM irrelevance theorem? How would figure 3 appear under MM irrele-
vance? 
 
 
 
Figure 2. 
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Figure 3. 
 
BT's debt/equity ratio and loan rate.
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Finally, figure 4 demonstrates firm value as a function of the debt/equity ratio. 
 
 What was BT’s optimal debt/equity ratio in 1998-2002, as suggested by figure 4? 
 
BT’s Optimal Capital Structure? 
 
We have observed that data on BT‟s capital structure and market value from 1998-2002 can be used to infer a 
possible optimal capital structure for BT. The charts demonstrate that firm value (and equity value) increase consis-
tently as debt increases between 1998 and 2000. Firm value is maximised in the year 2000, when debt reached 
£11bn (12.6% of the capital structure, or, equivalently, a debt/equity ratio of 14%). After the year 2000, debt in-
creased dramatically to £31bn (approximately 50% of total capital), and firm value fell. 
 
The charts suggest that BT went beyond its optimal capital structure from the year 2000.  
 
 
Figure 4. 
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What trade-offs are involved in determining this optimal capital structure? How did BT determine its capital 
structure policy between 1998 and 2002? Why did BT go beyond the optimal level of debt? 
 
Although there are many factors that influence the effect of the capital structure on firm value, we have noted 
that they may be considered under the following broad categories; tax relief effects, debt capacity and business risk, 
agency costs, and signalling. 
 
The data suggests that BT experienced a trade-off between tax relief and debt capacity, with an optimal (value 
maximising) debt level of £11bn. Throughout the period, the level of tax consistently reduced as debt increased. 
However, from chart 3, it can be observed that, as debt increased, the loan rate increased. BT has reached its debt 
capacity, and further increases beyond this caused a downgrading of its credit rating, with an associated increase in 
the loan rate.  
  
Why did BT go beyond this optimum? 
 
Without detailed inside knowledge of the management rationale for such high debt levels, we can only sur-
mise the answer to this question. There may have been several factors involved in the BT debt policy. Fortunately, 
we are able to appeal to the various capital structure theories to shed some light. 
 
Firstly, it is possible that BT fell into the trap of considering debt as a cheap form of financing (with its low 
loan rates). Why is this a fallacious view, according to the MM irrelevance theorem? 
 
Secondly, BT may have become focused on the tax relief effect. Initially, they would have observed the in-
crease in firm value as they increased the debt level. When they won the 3G mobile contract, they may have be-
lieved that the increased prospects for the Group had increased their debt capacity. This justified taking large levels 
of debt to increase the tax shield. 
 
BT possibly had an over-optimistic view of the prospects for 3G, and for the Group as a whole. On observing 
such large levels of debt, rating agencies downgraded BT. BT had gone beyond its debt capacity. 
 
Besides the simple trade-off between tax relief and debt capacity, there may have been other factors involved 
in BT‟s decision to increase debt. From the Jensen and Meckling (1976) model, the management of BT may not 
have wanted to dilute their own equity stake, since dilution may have reduced managerial effort incentives. The 
company may have also been attempting to commit to a high effort level, due to the disciplining role of debt (ie the 
bankruptcy threat).  Further, BT may have believed that, if 3G generated large free cash flows, it would be better to 
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finance with debt (Jensen 1986).  
 
Signalling considerations may have played an important role in BT‟s debt policy. It may have been believed 
that high levels of debt provided a strong signal of BT‟s confidence in the future (as in Ross 1977), or that issuing 
equity may have signalled bad future prospects (as in Myers and Majluf 1984, Leland and Pyle 1977). Indeed, when 
debt reduction measures (from the current £31bn) were discussed at the AGM in 2001, one investor suggested in-
creasing debt even further to demonstrate BT‟s strength! Decreasing debt would be a sign of weakness! 
 
BT may simply have had a preference for debt (as in Myers and Majluf‟s (1984) pecking order theory). Fur-
thermore, BT may have used the type of model suggested by Levy (1998) or Opler et al (1997). Following Levy‟s 
suggestion, they may have been trying out this level of debt, and got it horribly wrong! 
 
Whatever the reasons, it is apparent that BT went beyond its optimal debt-equity ratio after 2000. Analysis of 
this period suggests an optimal debt level of £11bn. Indeed, BT has taken measures to reduce debt. However, capital 
structure policies are dynamic, and the optimal capital structure policy needs to be regularly revisited.  
 
Other Players in the Industry 
 
Damadoran (2001) states that firms often choose their capital structures by benchmarking against other firms 
in the industry. In this section, we consider two other companies in the telecommunications industry; Deutsche 
Telekom, and France Telecom. 
 
Their capital structures are as follows; 
 
Deutsche Telekom 
 
Euros (millions) 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Debt 44938 39933 42337 60357 67031 
Equity (Mkt Value) 47486 76875 213842 97250 81436 
Firm mkt Value 92424 116808 256179 157607 148467 
% Debt 48.8 34.2 16.5 38.3 45.1 
D/E ratio 0.946 0.519 0.198 0.62 0.82 
  
 
France Telecom 
 
Euros (millions) 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Debt 16009 15145 17163 63254 67504 
Equity (Mkt Value) 33280 69353 134532 106093 51807 
Firm mkt Value 49289 84498 151695 169347 119311 
% Debt 32.5 17.9 11.3 37.4 56.6 
D/E ratio 0.48 0.22 0.13 0.60 1.30 
 
 
How do these tables suggest benchmarking in the telecommunications industry? What optimal capital struc-
ture do the tables suggest for Deutsche Telekom and France Telecom? How does this compare with BT? 
 
Conclusion 
 
We have investigated BT‟s capital structure policy during the period 1998-2002. Consideration of this case in 
conjunction with the various capital structure theories has allowed us to address the following questions; 
 
 
a) Why did BT take on so much debt during this period? Why did this cause firm value to fall, when many 
International Business & Economics Research Journal                                                             Volume 2, Number 5 
 86 
capital structure theories suggest a positive relationship between leverage and firm value? 
b) Why has the reduction in debt caused a partial recovery in equity value? 
c) Was BT beyond its optimal debt/equity ratio from he year 2000? 
d) Does BT have an optimal capital structure? What is it? Is it static? What are the trade-offs involved for BT? 
e) Does BT‟s case hold lessons for other firms?   
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